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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Synthetic drugs, as opposed to naturally occurring drugs (e.g. cocaine and 
opium), are man-made chemical substances that are manufactured in laboratories and 
are designed to mimic the molecular structures and effects of controlled substances.
1
 
Traditional synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamine and ecstasy (MDMA or 3,4-
methylenedioxymethamphetamine), were made by clandestine chemists and 
                                                          
        J.D. expected May 2015, The George Washington University Law School; M.A., 
Government, 2008, Georgetown University; B.A., Political Science, 2003, Western 
Washington University. I would like to thank my parents for their unwavering support, 
encouragement, and guidance.     
 1 Dangerous Synthetic Drugs: Hearing Before the S. Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control, 
113th Cong. 34 (2013) (statement of Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Deputy Assistant Administrator, 
Drug Enforcement Administration U. S. Dep’t of Justice). 
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introduced into the United States via the black market.
2
 In 2008, law enforcement in 
America began to encounter a new generation of synthetic drugs that were marketed 
as “legal” alternatives to illicit drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin.
3
 Under 
the law, specifically the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), the legality of these 
substances is in a state of ambiguity due to an outdated Controlled Substances 
Analogue Enforcement Act (Analogue Act) and an overly restrictive Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) temporary scheduling authority.
4
 
This new generation of synthetic drugs is made up of two primary categories of 
substances: (1) synthetic cannabinoids (commonly referred to as “synthetic 
marijuana,” “Spice,” or “K2”) and (2) synthetic cathinones (commonly referred to as 
“bath salts”).
5
 Other substances that fall into this new generation of synthetic drugs 
include phenethylamines (e.g. the 2C compound series), piperazines, tryptamines, 
and arylcyclohexamines.
6
 
Instead of being sold on street corners and back alleys like the illicit drugs they 
purport to mimic, this new generation of synthetic drugs is sold openly in small retail 
locations such as gas stations, convenience stores, and the Internet.
7
 Young people, 
who are a primary target consumer for synthetic drugs, are especially vulnerable to 
the mistaken belief that these substances are safe because they are marketed as 
legal.
8
 In addition, the seemingly infinite number of different chemical compositions 
of these drugs and the speed in which new varieties appear on the market has caused 
significant challenges to government control efforts, including state governments, 
which are unable to keep pace with the quickly changing product supply.
9
 
Internationally, countries in all regions of the world face similar challenges and have 
experienced a proliferation of synthetic drugs in recent years.
10
 
Urgent action is needed to control synthetic drugs before they take root in the 
U.S. drug market. The potential public health consequences of synthetic drugs are 
cause for significant concern due to widespread availability of these drugs and the 
                                                          
 2 Id. 
 3 Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, Synthetic Drugs (a.k.a. K2, Spice, Bath Salts, etc.), 
THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/ondcp-fact-sheets/synthetic-drugs-k2-
spice-bath-salts (last visited Dec. 2, 2013). 
 4 Ben Paynter, The Big Business of Synthetic Highs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jun. 6, 
2011), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/articles/57544-the-big-business-of-synthetic-
highs; Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 
84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2012)), 21 U.S.C. § 813 (2012), 
21 U.S.C. § 811 (2012). 
 5 Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, supra note 3. 
 6 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 1619. 
 7 Id. at 5. 
 8 Id.  at 7. 
 9 Dangerous Synthetic Drugs: Hearing Before the S. Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control, 
113th Cong. 4 (2013) (written statement of Michael P. Botticelli, Deputy Dir., Office of Nat’l 
Drug Control Policy). 
 10 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT, U.N. Sales No. E.14.XI.7 iii 
(2013). 
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violent and unpredictable behavior they can cause in users.
11
 Also, violent drug 
trafficking organizations are likely to enter the synthetic drugs business, if they have 
not already done so, due to the existence of a market worth billions of dollars.
12
 In 
addition, terrorist organizations in the Middle East have begun to use synthetic drug 
sales in the U.S. as quick and easy financing opportunities.
13
 
This article reviews the federal government’s attempts to control the influx of 
synthetic drugs, particularly synthetic cannabinoids and cathinones, into the U.S. 
recreational drug market since 2008. It offers three recommendations targeted at 
Congress, the DEA, and the Department of State on ways to prevent and control 
synthetic drug use in America: (1) Congress should grant the DEA a new 
“immediate scheduling” authority; (2) the DEA should improve information sharing 
with states; and (3) the Department of State and the DEA should prioritize the 
development of a global early warning system. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In 2009, the DEA’s national forensics database contained fifteen synthetic 
cannabinoid reports related to two different substances and thirty-four synthetic 
cathinone reports related to four different substances.
14
 By 2012, the number of 
synthetic cannabinoid reports exceeded 41,200 and related to fifty-six different 
substances, and the database contained 14,100 synthetic cathinone reports related to 
thirty-one different substances.
15
 In addition, seventy-six other synthetic substances 
were identified in 2012,
16
 bringing the total number of synthetic substances 
identified to well over 150 in that year alone.
17
 Due to the volume and speed in 
which synthetic drugs appear on the market, federal, state, and local governments 
have found it difficult to keep pace.
18
 The attempt to stop the cycle of a new 
                                                          
 11 See Thomas M. Penders et al., Excited Delirium Following Use of Synthetic Cathinones 
(Bath Salts), 34 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 647, 64750 (2012), available at http://www. 
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016383431200196X#. 
 12 See JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41576,  MEXICO’S DRUG TRAFFICKING 
ORGANIZATIONS: SOURCE AND SCOPE OF THE VIOLENCE 3839 (2013); Ben Paynter, The Big 
Business of Synthetic Highs, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jun. 6, 2011), http://www.business 
week.com/printer/articles/57544-the-big-business-of-synthetic-highs (stating the synthetic 
cannabinoid market alone could be worth $5 billion annually). 
 13 Dan Box, Synthetic Drugs Funding Terror, THE AUSTRALIAN (Jun. 29, 2013), 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/synthetic-drugs-funding-terror/story-e6frg6nf-
1226671653448; Jack Cloherty & Sally Zhang, Bath Salts and Other Synthetic Drugs Making 
"Millions" for Terrorists, ABC NEWS (Jun. 27, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/bath-
salts-synthetic-drugs-making-millions-terrorists/story?id=19507041;Mary Kilpatrick, Houma 
Drug Profits May be Tied to Middle East, Police Say, WWLTV.COM (Jun. 27, 2013), 
http://www.wwltv.com/news/lafourche-terrebonne/213360701.html. 
 14 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 4. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Botticelli, supra note 9, at 3. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Emily Ethridge, Lawmakers Attempt to Keep Up with Synthetic Drugs, ROLL CALL (Oct. 
28, 2013), http://www.rollcall.com/news/lawmakers_attempt_to_keep_up_with_ 
synthetic_drugs-228680-1.html. 
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substance emerging, being banned, and immediately having another new substance 
take its place has been likened to a “whack-a-mole game.”
19
 Halting this cycle is 
made even more challenging by the existence of multiple compound classes of 
synthetic drugs, each with its own unique characteristics.
20
 
A.  Synthetic Cannabinoids 
Synthetic cannabinoids are man-made chemicals that are manufactured and 
marketed to mimic the effects of THC (delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol), the primary 
psychoactive ingredient in marijuana.
21
 Synthetic cannabinoids are generally 
sprayed onto dried plant material and then consumed through smoking or oral 
ingestion.
22
 In November 2008, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) became 
the first federal law enforcement agency to encounter synthetic cannabinoid products 
in the United States.
23
 Most synthetic cannabinoid chemicals are manufactured in 
Asia, primarily China, by chemists who ignore quality control standards and are 
shipped to the U.S. under misbranded imports, where local distributors apply the 
drug to plant material.
24
 The final product is sold in individual packets in small retail 
outlets, such as gas stations and convenient stores, as well as on the Internet, under 
hundreds of different brand names such as “Spice,” “K2,” and “Black Magic.”
25
 The 
average price for 2.5 grams of synthetic cannabinoid product is approximately $30.
26
 
Synthetic cannabinoid products are often marketed as “herbal incense” to hide 
their true purpose.
27
 In addition, their packaging usually carries the phrase “not for 
human consumption” in an attempt to frustrate the application of the Analogue Act, 
which states that controlled substance analogues shall, “to the extent intended for 
human consumption,” be treated as a controlled substance in Schedule I,
 28
 the most 
restrictive of the five schedules in the CSA.
29
 
                                                          
 19 Olga Khazan, Synthetic Drugs Are Multiplying Too Fast for Regulators to Outlaw 
Them, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 27, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/ 
06/synthetic-drugs-are-multiplying-too-fast-for-regulators-to-outlaw-them/277321/. 
 20 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 519. 
 21 Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, supra note 3. 
 22 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 6. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 6. 
 25 Id. at 56. 
 26 Mary Kilpatrick, Houma Drug Profits May be Tied to Middle East, Police Say, 
WWLTV.COM (Jun. 27, 2013), http://www.wwltv.com/news/lafourche-terrebonne/ 
213360701.html. 
 27 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 5. 
 28 Id.; 21 U.S.C. § 813 (2012). 
 29 Drugs, substances, and certain chemicals used to make drugs are classified into five 
distinct schedules in the CSA depending upon the drug’s acceptable medical use and the 
drug’s abuse or dependency potential. The abuse rate is a determinate factor in the scheduling 
of the drug; for example, Schedule I drugs are considered the most dangerous class of drugs 
with a high potential for abuse and potentially severe psychological and physical dependence. 
168 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 27:164 
 
 
Young people are the primary users of synthetic cannabinoids.
30
 According to 
the 2013 Monitoring the Future survey of youth drug-use trends, about eight percent 
of twelfth graders in America reported using synthetic cannabinoids in the past 
year.
31
 This rate puts synthetic cannabinoids as the third most frequently used drug 
among high school seniors after marijuana and amphetamines.
32
 Many young people 
have tried synthetic cannabinoids and suffered adverse health consequences 
believing that, because these products can be bought in a store or are marketed 
online as being legal, they must be safe.
33
 
In reality, use of synthetic cannabinoids can be extremely harmful. Clemson 
University Professor John W. Huffman, credited with synthesis of some of the first 
cannabinoids such as JWH-018, was quoted as saying “these things are dangerous—
anybody who uses them is playing Russian roulette.”
34
 The contents and effects of 
synthetic cannabinoids have profound psychological effects.
35
 They are also 
unpredictable due to a constantly changing variety of chemicals used in 
manufacturing processes devoid of quality controls and government regulatory 
oversight.
36
 
B.  Synthetic Cathinones    
A number of synthetic cathinone products are central nervous system 
stimulants.
37
 They attempt to mimic the effects of traditional stimulants such as 
amphetamine, ecstasy, and cocaine.
38
 Common compounds found in synthetic 
cathinones include methcathinone, methylone (3,4-methylenedioxy-N-
methylcathinone), and 4-MEC (4-methyl-N-ethylcathinone).
39
 Unlike 
methamphetamine, ecstasy, and cocaine, these substances are marketed as legal 
alternatives to banned drugs.
40
 They are sold under the guise of products such as 
                                                          
 30 Press Release, Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA News: Nationwide Synthetic Drug 
Takedown (Jul. 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/ 
pr072612.html. 
 31 LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., MONITORING THE FUTURE, 2013 OVERVIEW: KEY FINDINGS 
ON ADOLESCENT DRUG USE 13, 59 (2014), available at http://www.monitoringthefuture.org/ 
pubs/monographs/mtf-overview2013.pdf. 
 32 Id. at 5960. 
 33 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 4. 
 34 David Zucchino, Scientist’s Research Produces a Dangerous High, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 
28, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-killer-weed-20110928,0, 
2646834.story?page=1. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, supra note 3. 
 37 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 12. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
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“bath salts” and “plant food” and, similar to synthetic cannabinoids, are labeled “not 
for human consumption” in an attempt to avoid application of the Analogue Act.
41
 
Most synthetic cathinones are made in bulk in Asia, primarily China, and shipped 
to distributors in the United States.
42
 Similar to synthetic cannabinoids, synthetic 
cathinones are sold at small retail locations such as gas stations and online under 
brand names such as “Ivory Wave,” “Vanilla Sky,” and “Energy-1.”
43
 Powder and 
crystal forms of synthetic cathinones are sold for $20 to $50 for approximately 500 
milligrams and are snorted, smoked, or injected by users.
44
 
C.  Other Synthetic Drugs   
Other substances associated with this new generation of synthetic drugs include 
phenethylamines, piperazines, tryptamines, and arylcyclohexamines.
45
 The 2C 
compound series, a category of phenethylamines, have become popular 
hallucinogenic drugs.
46
 These substances are often promoted as legal alternatives to 
LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide).
47
 Unlike synthetic cannabinoids and cathinones, 
these substances are often sold on blotter paper or in dropper bottles.
48
 They are also 
not found in retail environments and are instead sold primarily online for between 
five dollars and ten dollars per dosage.
49
 An especially strong variety of the 2C 
series, 25I-NBOMe, was linked to at least fourteen deaths in a fourteen-month 
period during 2012 and 2013.
50
 
Piperazines are a class of compounds that are often sold as legal ecstasy and are 
marketed to produce euphoria in users.
51
 Tryptamines are sold as hallucinogens and 
can cause changes in sensory, visual, and gustatory perceptions, among other 
effects.
52
 Arylcyclohexamines are a class of compounds that are structurally and 
pharmacologically similar to PCP (phencyclidine), a drug known for producing 
highly unpredictable behavior.
53
 The substance most commonly found in products in 
this class, MXE (methoxetamine), is about 2.5 times more potent than PCP.
54
 
                                                          
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 1213. 
 44 Id. at 13. 
 45 Id. at 1619. 
 46 Id. at 17. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 18. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. at 19. 
 53 See id.  
 54 See id. 
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D.  The Rise and Adulteration of “Molly”  
The term “Molly” dates back several years and has traditionally been used to 
describe the pure, high quality, powder form of ecstasy.
55
 Molly became popular in 
the concert and club scenes and was mostly used by teenagers and people in their 
twenties.
56
 Musical artists such as Miley Cyrus, Kanye West, and Rihanna have all 
included verses about Molly in their music.
57
 However, synthetic drug 
manufacturers have attempted to cash in on the popularity of Molly by replacing the 
traditional Molly ingredient, MDMA, with a myriad of other substances, including 
ingredients commonly found in synthetic cathinone products.
58
 Between October 
2009 and September 2013, the DEA found that only thirteen percent of seized drugs 
believed to be Molly that were submitted to a laboratory in New York contained 
MDMA.
59
 The results of the adulteration of Molly have been grave. In June 2013, at 
a large electronic music festival at the Gorge Amphitheatre in Washington State, one 
person died and 125 were hospitalized after taking a drug marketed as “Molly.”
60
 In 
the one-week period surrounding Labor Day weekend in 2013, four people died in 
three East Coast cities after taking substances sold as “Molly.”
61
 
The rise of Molly, and its subsequent adulteration, is an example of the 
dangerous uncertainty inherent in all synthetic drugs. Even if buying the same brand 
from the same dealer, users are unaware of what they are putting into their bodies 
from one package to the next. Chemical ingredients and dosage amounts vary 
widely. As exemplified by products being marketed as “Molly,” such uncertainty can 
be deadly.
62
 
III.  A SENSE OF URGENCY IS NEEDED 
A sense of urgency is needed to control synthetic drugs before they take 
permanent root in the U.S. drug market. There are three primary reasons reform is 
urgently needed: (1) decrease negative public health consequences; (2) prevent the 
incentive for large scale trafficking; and (3) eliminate an easy income stream for 
terrorist organizations. First, synthetic drugs endanger public health and burden the 
                                                          
 55 See id. at 13. 
 56 Dave Savini, 2 Investigators: Overdoses of Drug ‘Molly’ Skyrocketing, CBSLOCAL.COM 
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2013/10/08/2-investigators-overdoses-of-drug-
molly-skyrocketing/. 
 57 Molly Is a Drug & There Are a Lot of Songs About Molly, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 5, 
2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/05/molly-drug-songs_n_3874047.html. 
 58 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 15. 
 59 Drew Griffin et al., 9 Things Everyone Should Know About the Drug Molly, CNN (Nov. 
23, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/22/health/9-things-molly-drug/. 
 60 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 14. 
 61 Peter Hermann & Jenna Johnson, Clubgoer Who Died in D.C. Might Have Used Drug 
Linked to Deaths in Boston, New York, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.washington 
post.com/local/clubgoer-who-died-in-dc-might-have-used-drug-linked-to-deaths-in-boston-
new-york/2013/09/05/e2245a8c-1662-11e3-804b-d3a1a3a18f2c_print.html. 
 62 See id. 
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healthcare system.
63
 The potential threat of these substances to users themselves and 
the subsequent impact on our communities is alarming. According to a 2013 report 
by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration’s (SAMHSA) 
Drug Abuse Warning Network, 28,531 emergency department visits involving a 
synthetic cannabinoid product occurred in 2011.
64
 This number of visits was 2.5 
times higher than the 11,406 emergency department visits that took place in 2010.
65
 
In addition, in 2011 (the only year for which there is available data), bath salts 
products were involved in 22,904 emergency department visits.
66
 
In many hospitals around the country, emergency departments must regularly 
confront users of synthetic drugs, many of whom are in delusional states and are 
dangerous to hospital staff.
67
 Communities in general are also seeing unpredictable 
and dangerous behavior caused by these substances.
68
 Use of synthetic drugs can 
cause anxiety, tachycardia (fast, racing heartbeat), elevated blood pressure, tremors, 
seizures, hallucinations, paranoid behavior, and non-responsiveness.
69
 It has also 
caused significant organ damage, as well as death.
70
 Some users of synthetic 
cannabinoid products have described their experience under the drug as a hell from 
which they cannot escape,
71
 and online discussion boards are full of posts from users 
who have described harmful behavior under these substances.
72
 In at least one case, 
the anxiety produced from such an experience has led to suicide.
73
 
  In addition, users of synthetic cathinones can experience a syndrome called 
“excited delirium,” which can cause paranoia, severe agitation, and violent 
                                                          
 63 A National Security Strategy for A New Century, NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL (May 1997), 
http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/. 
 64 Drug Abuse Warning Network, 2011: National Estimates of Drug-Related Emergency 
Department Visits, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (May 2013), http://www.samhsa. 
gov/data/2k13/DAWN2k11ED/DAWN2k11ED.htm. 
 65 See id. 
 66 Data Spotlight: “Bath Salts” Were Involved in Over 20,000 Drug-Related Emergency 
Department Visits in 2011, DAWN REPORT (SAMHSA) (Sept. 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/spotlight/spot117-bath-salts-2013.pdf. 
 67 Michael Booth, Denver ERs Say Synthetic Pot Spurs Surge of Agitated, Violent 
Patients, DENVER POST (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ 
ci_23973376/. 
 68 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 8. 
 69 See id. 
 70 Botticelli, supra note 9, at 2. 
 71 Anna Schecter, Amazon.com Sells ‘Legal Pot’, ABC NEWS (Jun. 2, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/amazon-sells-legal-pot/story?id=13743738; SirDoughBoy, Hell 
Inside My Own Mind Posting, EROWID EXPERIENCE VAULTS (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www. 
erowid.org/experiences/exp.php?ID=85174. 
 72 See Inoxia, A Trip Worse Than Hell, EROWID EXPERIENCE VAULTS (Oct. 13, 2010), 
http://www.erowid.org/experiences/exp.php?ID=85005. 
 73 Schecter, supra note 71. 
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behavior.
74
 A study of two poison centers reported that fifty-seven percent of 
patients who used synthetic cathinones exhibited combative and violent behavior.
75
 
Emergency departments are often ill-equipped to handle the delusional state and 
ferocity of people under these substances.
76
 
The underlying reason as to why synthetic drugs pose such a significant risk to 
public health is their availability.
77
 According to the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy, a 2013 poll of local law enforcement around the country reported 
that synthetic cannabinoids, synthetic cathinones, or both are readily available in 
their jurisdictions, and many reported an increase in availability.
78
 Unlike traditional 
drugs such as cocaine, sellers of synthetic drugs market the sale of their “legal” 
products openly in small retail outlets and on the Internet, which reduces the barriers 
to purchase.
79
 While most traditional drugs must be bought on street corners and 
back alleys, synthetic drugs can be bought from brick and mortar businesses or 
shipped directly to homes via the Internet.
80
 Sellers openly market their products as 
legal because, due to an ambiguous federal analogue law, they can quickly change 
the chemical compositions of their products and then make the argument that they 
have not violated government bans.
81
 Should the availability of synthetic drugs 
persist, and should emergency departments continue to be inundated with users, 
America could end up in the middle of a drug epidemic on a scale it has never seen 
before. 
The second reason that a sense of urgency is needed is the potential for violent 
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) to enter the synthetic drugs business. 
Because the profits from synthetic drugs are so immense, international criminal 
syndicates, particularly DTOs, are likely to become major players in synthetic drug 
trafficking if demand persists.
82
 The DEA currently estimates that synthetic drugs 
arrive in the United States primarily from Asian manufacturers who are not bound by 
the same controls on substances that American manufacturers are.
83
 However, 
because DTOs already have extensive distribution networks in place, it is unlikely 
                                                          
 74 See Penders et al., supra note 11, at 64750. 
 75 Henry A.Spiller et al., Clinical Experience with and Analytical Confirmation of “Bath 
Salts” and “Legal Highs” (Synthetic Cathinones) in the United States 49 CLINICAL 
TOXICOLOGY 499, 499505 (2011), available at http://new.dhh.louisiana.gov/assets/ 
docs/BehavioralHealth/BathSaltsarticlefromClinicalToxicologyJuly2011.pdf. 
 76 Booth, supra note 67. 
 77 See Ethridge, supra note 18. 
 78 Botticelli, supra note 9. 
 79 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 5. 
 80 Id. at 28. 
 81 Id.   
 82 See BEITTEL, supra note 12.  
 83 Rannazzisi, supra note 1, at 6. 
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they will stay out of the synthetic drugs business if they believe they are missing out 
on easy profits.
84
 
The recreational drug market in North America is estimated to be valued at 
approximately $121 billion.
85
 The enormous amounts of money that can be made 
from selling drugs have given rise to large DTOs, many of which are headquartered 
in Mexico.
86
 Violence, including mass killings, torture, political assassinations, and 
car bombs, is an inherent feature of DTOs.
87
 It is estimated that between 2006 and 
2012 there were 60,000 organized crime related homicides in Mexico.
88
 
With immense profits to be made, DTOs will almost certainly enter the synthetic 
drug market if they have not already done so. A 2012 United Nations resolution 
highlighted “the potential opportunities for transnational organized criminal groups 
to exploit the market for these substances.”
89
 While the total market for synthetic 
drugs in the U.S. is difficult to estimate, perhaps because of its relatively recent 
appearance in this country, by one estimate, the North American market for synthetic 
cannabinoids alone is $5 billion.
90
 
Perhaps more concretely indicative of the large amounts of money to be made in 
the synthetic drugs business were two DEA-led synthetic drugs law enforcement 
operations in 2012 and 2013 that seized currency and assets of $45 million and $53 
million respectively.
91
 During the 2013 operation, a synthetic cannabinoids 
distributor near Houston told undercover DEA agents that he initially invested 
$80,000 and turned it into $6 million.
92
 This distributor noted that “you can’t rob 
banks and make this kind of money.”
93
 DTOs would be highly interested in such a 
lucrative new revenue stream, especially because they already have the proper 
infrastructure in place with drug distribution networks in more than 1,000 U.S. 
cities.
94
 They are also already heavily involved in the trafficking of traditional 
synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamine.
95
 The resulting competition for synthetic 
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drug sales supremacy among DTOs, clashes over territory with existing distributors, 
and conflict with law enforcement, would be bloody. In addition, synthetic drugs 
would likely become even cheaper and easier to purchase than they already are as 
the resources and distribution networks of large DTOs create economies of scale.    
The third reason that a sense of urgency is needed is that the U.S. synthetic drugs 
market has also attracted the attention of terrorist organizations looking for quick 
and easy financing opportunities.
96
 The DEA has stated that the proceeds from 
synthetic drug sales in America have gone to countries in the Middle East,
97
 and 
news reports specify that millions of dollars of such proceeds are flowing into the 
hands of terror groups.
98
 While the connection between terrorism and drugs is not a 
new phenomenon,
99
 the connection with synthetic drugs in particular makes sense. 
Instead of needing acres of land and field workers to grow poppy or coca plants, all 
terrorist organizations need to make synthetic drugs is a laboratory and a chemist.
100
 
The internet can provide most of the necessary information on ingredients and 
recipes.
101
 The organization would then only require a willing distributor in the 
United States to whom products could be shipped. Because of the link between 
synthetic drugs and terrorism, the harm is twofold; terror groups harm Americans by 
selling them dangerous synthetic substances while using the profits to finance terror 
operations.
102
  
IV.  A SYSTEM OF INSUFFICIENT FEDERAL STATUTORY REGULATION 
While the potential for an increase in harms associated with synthetic drugs 
continues to grow, Congress has done surprisingly little to update the CSA to meet 
the unique challenges of these substances. The CSA, enacted in 1970, regulates the 
manufacture, possession, use, importation, and distribution of certain drugs, 
substances, and precursor chemicals.
103
 Under the CSA there are five schedules, 
with Schedule I being the most restrictive.
104
 Originally, there were only two ways 
to schedule substances. First, Congress could schedule through legislation.
105
 
Second, the Attorney General (through the DEA), with a recommendation from the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), could schedule through the formal 
                                                          
 96 Box, supra note 13; Cloherty & Zhang, supra note 13; Kilpatrick, supra note 13.  
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rulemaking process.
106
 The CSA mandated that eight factors be considered when 
scheduling through formal rulemaking, which is often referred to as “permanent 
scheduling.”
107
 However, it soon became apparent that these two methods were not 
sufficient to keep pace with the changing landscape of drugs in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.
108
 As a result, Congress made two amendments to the CSA.
109
 
The first change made by Congress came in 1984 and gave the Attorney General, 
who delegated to the DEA, temporary scheduling authority.
110
 Often referred to as 
“emergency scheduling,” this authority allows the DEA to place a substance onto 
Schedule I of the CSA to “avoid imminent hazards to public safety.”
111
 Only three 
of the eight factors considered in the permanent scheduling process must be 
considered when the DEA is determining whether a substance is an imminent 
hazard: (1) the drug’s history and pattern of abuse; (2) scope, duration, and 
significance of abuse; and (3) risk to public health.
112
 Also, the DEA does not need 
to go through the formal rulemaking process when using its temporary scheduling 
authority.
113
 The scheduling goes into effect thirty days from the date the DEA 
publishes its notice of temporary scheduling in the Federal Register and notifies the 
Secretary of HHS.
114
 Once a substance has been scheduled through the temporary 
scheduling process, a substance may remain on Schedule I for up to three years.
115
 
The second amendment Congress made to the CSA was to enact the Analogue 
Act in 1986.
116
 The law was meant to “prohibit persons who specifically set out to 
manufacture or to distribute drugs which are substantially similar to the most 
dangerous controlled substances from engaging in this activity.”
117
 The Analogue 
Act provides that a “controlled substance analogue shall, to the extent intended for 
human consumption,” be treated as a controlled substance in Schedule I.
118
 As 
interpreted by various courts, to establish that a substance falls within the definition 
of a “controlled substance analogue,” a federal prosecutor must prove the following 
elements:  
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(1) the substance was intended for human consumption; AND 
(2) the chemical structure of the substance is substantially similar to the 
chemical structure of a schedule I or II controlled substance; AND EITHER 
that  
(3) the substance has a similar or greater pharmacological effect on the central 
nervous system than a schedule I or II controlled substance; OR that  
(4) with respect to a particular person, that such person represents or intends the 
substance to have a pharmacological effect substantially similar to or greater 
than a schedule I or II controlled substance.
119
 
 
Soon after law enforcement first began to encounter significant quantities and 
varieties of synthetic cannabinoids and cathinones in 2008, it became apparent that 
the existing CSA was not a sufficient tool to combat this new generation of synthetic 
drugs.
120
 Small retail shops and internet sites were openly selling such substances 
without fear of prosecution.
121
 Amazon.com was even allowing independent 
retailers to sell synthetic cannabinoids as “herbal incense” products on its 
website.
122
 Because these new synthetic substances were not scheduled, the 
Analogue Act became federal law enforcement’s primary enforcement authority.
123
 
As a result, the number of individuals charged under the Analogue Act increased 
significantly.
124
 Between 1984 and 2011, the Analogue Act had only been used to 
prosecute sixty-two individuals.
125
 Between 2011 and September 2013, 280 
individuals were similarly charged.
126
 
However, those attempting to prosecute manufacturers and sellers of this new 
generation of synthetic drugs under the Analogue Act have encountered a 
challenging road to conviction. According to Timothy J. Heaphy, U.S. Attorney for 
the Western District of Virginia, the primary prosecutorial challenge is that expert 
testimony must be used to convince lay juries that an analogue is “chemically 
similar” to a scheduled drug.
127
 Heaphy explained that whether compounds are 
substantially similar or dissimilar are subjective opinions, rendering each expert’s 
testimony open to debate.
128
 This debate—which is often described as a “battle of 
the experts”—is especially difficult because of the government’s burden to convince 
juries lacking scientific expertise that a substance is an analogue “beyond a 
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reasonable doubt.”
129
 In addition, substances that are proven in one case to be 
analogues do not carry over to subsequent cases.
130
 Such challenges to proving that 
a drug is an analogue under the CSA complicates successful prosecutions, and the 
uncertainty present in Analogue Act cases can be a reason why overburdened federal 
prosecutors may choose not to pursue such cases.
131
 
Congress attempted to fix the deficiencies in the CSA by enacting the Synthetic 
Drug Abuse Prevention Act of 2012 (SDAPA).
132
 However, SDAPA fell far short of 
implementing the changes needed to stem the growing tide of synthetic drug use. 
SDAPA placed twenty-six of the most common synthetic drugs into Schedule I of 
the CSA.
133
 These included fifteen synthetic cannabinoids, two synthetic cathinones, 
and nine synthetic phenethylamines in the 2C compound series.
134
 The law also 
added five “cannabimimetic agents” to Schedule I, which was essentially an effort to 
ban all of the broad structural classes of synthetic cannabinoids.
135
  SDAPA also 
doubled the maximum amount of time the DEA could temporarily schedule a 
substance from eighteen months to three years.
136
 
While Congress deserves credit for enacting SDAPA, it must do more. The law 
only served to buy time against the flood of synthetic drugs impacting America. It 
did not directly address the fundamental statutory problem: that the DEA’s 
temporary scheduling authority and the Analogue Act were not designed to, and are 
not capable of, providing sufficient statutory tools for law enforcement and 
prosecutors against the vast quantities of synthetic drugs that have inundated 
America since 2008. SDAPA banned twenty-six substances, but hundreds more were 
ready to take their place.
137
 In fact, the DEA estimates that there are at least 250 
synthetic drug compounds currently in the market.
138
 A September 25, 2013 
statement by a senior DEA official in front of Congress puts the effect of SDAPA 
into context: “[t]he extent and magnitude of the trafficking, regional distribution, and 
use of these drugs remains a problem since the passage of SDAPA and, in fact, 
designer drugs continue to proliferate throughout the country.”
139
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V.  RECOMMENDATION ONE: CONGRESS SHOULD GRANT THE DEA A NEW, 
“IMMEDIATE SCHEDULING” AUTHORITY 
The DEA’s scheduling authority should be enhanced in order to meet the intent 
of the original 1984 temporary scheduling amendment to the CSA. The DEA has 
attempted to combat synthetic drugs through its current temporary scheduling 
authority, but it is fighting an uphill battle. In 2011, the DEA temporarily scheduled 
five synthetic cannabinoids and three synthetic cathinones that were eventually 
permanently scheduled.140 In addition, in 2013, the DEA temporarily scheduled three 
more synthetic cannabinoids and three synthetic phenethylamines.
141
 
These temporary scheduling actions by the DEA do not come close to keeping up 
with the vast numbers of synthetic substances in the market. Under the current 
statutory system, the DEA is being forced to constantly play catch-up against 
synthetic drug manufacturers and distributers that are always one or two moves 
ahead. Enacted in an era where it was difficult to imagine the speed of today’s world 
commerce that is quickened by the proliferation of internet access, cell phones, and 
other technologies, the temporary scheduling law and Analogue Act are simply 
outdated.
142
 
 The temporary scheduling process, while a faster and more flexible authority 
than permanent scheduling, still requires a significant expenditure of time and 
resources by the DEA, making it an ill-suited tool to keep pace with the quickly 
changing synthetic drug supply.
143
 The relatively few temporary scheduling actions 
that have taken place since 2008 compared to the high volume of synthetic 
substances is telling.
144
 The DEA must collect, analyze, and study data related to 
abuse of synthetic drugs in a manner sufficient to satisfy consideration of the three 
factors required to state that a substance is an “imminent hazard.”
145
 
Satisfying consideration of these factors may have been a wise congressional 
check on the DEA’s authority in 1984, but that was also before the Internet and other 
technologies changed the speed of world commerce. The technology and knowledge 
needed to quickly synthesize new synthetic drugs has become ubiquitous.
146
 For 
example, a manufacturer in China, upon learning that a substance has been 
scheduled in the U.S., can go through the relatively easy process of synthesizing a 
chemically similar, yet different substance and have it for sale on a website in a few 
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days.
147
 A few days later, that substance could be on sale by local distributors in the 
United States.
148
 A new scheduling authority is needed to narrow the uneven playing 
field that currently exists between federal law enforcement and synthetic drug 
manufacturers and sellers.  
 The DEA should be given a brand new “immediate scheduling” authority that is 
completely separate from its current temporary scheduling power and is specifically 
designed to combat synthetic drug analogues. This authority would allow for faster 
temporary scheduling, would be narrower in scope, and would expire quicker. 
Specifically, immediate scheduling, as recommended here, would authorize the 
Attorney General, through the DEA, to do the following: 
(1) Place on Schedule I of the CSA any substance that falls within the major 
compound classes of synthetic drugs, including synthetic cannabinoids, 
synthetic cathinones, phenethylamines, piperazines, tryptamines, and 
arylcyclohexamines. 
(2) (a) The DEA would be required publish its intent to schedule in the Federal 
Register.  
(b) Thirty days following the date of publication in the Federal Register, the 
substance would be placed on Schedule I of the CSA.   
(3) The scheduling of substances under this process would expire at the end of 
six months, except that the DEA could extend the scheduling for up to six 
months, for a total amount of time not to exceed one year. 
(4) (a) The Secretary of HHS would have a “veto” authority to deny any 
proposed scheduling action under this scheduling process once the DEA has 
published a notice of intent to schedule in the Federal Register.  
(b) The Secretary of HHS would also have the ability to remove any 
substance placed on Schedule I of the CSA through this scheduling process 
at any time. 
This immediate scheduling authority would allow the DEA to schedule a 
substance that it believes to be a dangerous synthetic drug without expending the 
time and resources necessary to analyze the substance against the three factors 
required in temporary scheduling. It would also resolve the most significant 
challenge to prosecutions under the Analogue Act: proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt—through a battle of experts in court—that a substance is chemically similar to 
a scheduled drug. Under a system of immediate scheduling, the DEA would simply 
use its authority to immediately schedule substances it believes to be dangerous 
analogues. Eliminating this prosecutorial hurdle would make prosecutors more 
certain of outcomes in court and thus more willing to pursue synthetic drug cases. It 
would also act as a deterrent to manufacturers and sellers who could no longer claim 
ignorance based on the excuse that substances they were selling were not specifically 
scheduled.  
While the DEA would not be required to provide evidence and analysis of its 
reasons for scheduling when using this authority, there are three important checks on 
the DEA’s power under this recommendation. First, the DEA would only be 
authorized to schedule substances in the primary compound classes that currently 
encompass the synthetic drug market. By limiting immediate scheduling authority to 
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synthetic drugs, the DEA would only be given immediate scheduling authority to 
control substances that, due to a quickly changing product supply, require a fast and 
unfettered scheduling process. 
Second, the Secretary of HHS would have absolute veto and removal power over 
the process. This would allow the Secretary to disallow the scheduling of any 
substance that would negatively impact public health and medical research interests. 
For example, if the DEA sought to immediately schedule a chemical that was also 
used in cancer research, the Secretary would have the authority to block the DEA’s 
scheduling attempt. In reality, the Secretary would likely only need to make the DEA 
aware that the chemical was important to research, and the DEA would withdraw the 
scheduling action themselves. However, because the Secretary is closer to the 
medical community than the DEA, it is important that the Secretary have a defined 
responsibility in immediate scheduling. Third, the expiration timeframe of a 
maximum of one year for substances scheduled under this authority would allow 
enough breathing room for the DEA to collect further data for potential permanent 
scheduling, but would limit the time allotment to balance the lack of initial evidence 
and analysis needed for immediate scheduling.             
VI.  RECOMMENDATION TWO: THE DEA SHOULD IMPROVE INFORMATION SHARING 
WITH STATES 
States play a vital role in the effort to control synthetic drug use in America. 
Many states have shown themselves to be more willing than Congress to enact 
serious synthetic drug control legislation. In fact, by the time SDAPA was passed 
into law in July 2012, many states had already enacted laws.
149
 For example, Iowa’s 
synthetic drug law, a similar law to SDAPA, was passed almost a full year prior to 
SDAPA.
150
 By the time SDAPA was passed, Iowa was working on upgrading its 
synthetic drug law.
151
 Overall, at least forty-five states have banned one or more 
synthetic cannabinoids,
152
 and at least forty-three states have banned one or more 
synthetic cathinones.
153
 
In addition, many state attorneys general across the country have identified 
synthetic drugs as a priority issue during their tenure.
154
 Many of these attorneys 
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general have emergency scheduling authority, which they use frequently.
155
 For 
example, since taking office in January 2011, Florida’s current attorney general has 
used her emergency scheduling authority three times to temporarily schedule thirty-
two synthetic substances.
156
 Emergency scheduling authority is an especially 
valuable tool at the state level because legislatures are often only in session for a few 
months each year and thus only able to legislatively schedule substances during 
these months. This reality leaves large time gaps for new, unscheduled synthetic 
drugs to emerge. Emergency scheduling authority allows attorneys general to 
temporarily place synthetic substances on state scheduling lists and then wait for 
legislatures to reconvene for permanent legislative scheduling.
157
 
While many states are eager to control synthetic drugs, they often do not have the 
resources and manpower to identify all the substances that are flooding into their 
forensic laboratories in a timely manner.
158
 State and local forensic laboratories that 
were seeing only a small number of standard drug types a few years ago are now 
inundated, and often encumbered, as they attempt to identify a vast array of new 
synthetic drugs.
159
 The delay in identifying new substances leads to a delay in 
legislative or emergency scheduling, which helps create the “whack-a-mole” cycle 
described above.
160
 
Increased information sharing by the DEA can help resolve the whack-a-mole 
cycle. In contrast to states, whose knowledge of forensic testing and law 
enforcement seizures of new substances are limited to what takes place within their 
own borders, the DEA has a national perspective.
161
 The DEA’s National Forensic 
Laboratory Information System (NFLIS) includes data from forensic laboratories 
that handle approximately ninety percent of an estimated one million distinct annual 
state and local drug analysis cases.
162
 NFLIS includes forty-nine state forensic 
systems and ninety-four local forensic systems.
163
 It also includes the DEA’s and 
CBP’s forensic systems.
164
 
Because the DEA is the only entity in the country with a complete national 
perspective on synthetic drugs, it should provide states with as much information as 
possible to allow them to keep pace with, or stay ahead of, the quickly changing 
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synthetic drug supply. The DEA currently shares raw information related to the 
chemical structure and characteristics of synthetic drugs it identifies on swdrug.org, 
a website for federal, state, and local forensic law enforcement personnel.
165
 
However, the DEA must go a step further and actively monitor NFLIS to 
immediately alert states of new substances that should be scheduled. 
The DEA’s ability to know what new synthetic substances are emerging across 
the United States in real time through NFLIS would allow the DEA to effectively 
warn states about new synthetic drugs. For example, if a new synthetic cannabinoid 
is identified in a forensic laboratory in Ohio, the DEA, upon seeing the presence of a 
new substance in NFLIS and deeming it a threat, could alert states. Legislatures 
around the country could then add the new synthetic cannabinoid to lists of 
substances they plan on banning during the current legislative session or, for 
attorneys general with emergency scheduling authority, during their next round of 
emergency scheduling. As a result, the new synthetic cannabinoid that was first 
discovered in Ohio would be banned before it even arrived in the rest of the country. 
VII.  RECOMMENDATION THREE: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE DEA 
SHOULD PRIORITIZE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 
The synthetic drug (or “new psychoactive substance,” as it is referred to by the 
international community) problem is international in scope and cannot be effectively 
controlled by the United States alone.
166
 According to the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), an ever-increasing number of synthetic drugs have 
emerged across the world in recent years.
167
 Indeed, eighty-eight percent of 
countries that responded to an UNODC survey reported the emergence of synthetic 
drugs.
168
 In addition to the United States, synthetic substances are especially 
prevalent in many European countries.
169
 The largest European country, Russia, is 
an example of a nation that has seen devastating consequences as a result of 
synthetic drugs.
170
 
The harmful effects in Russia stem in part from the prevalence of a particularly 
dangerous synthetic drug called “krokodil” (or crocodile).
171
 Krokodil, also known 
by its chemical name, desomorphine, is manufactured and marketed to mimic heroin, 
although its effects are not as long lasting.
172
 It is also cheaper than heroin and can 
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be made relatively easily in homes.
173
 In Russia, a country with a serious heroin 
problem and few treatment options, many heroin addicts have made the switch to 
krokodil.
174
  The results have been alarming. 
Krokodil gets its name from its flesh rotting effect on the skin of its users.
175
 
Users’ skin turns scaly and continues to harden and turn gray before rotting away, a 
process known as necrosis.
176
 In addition, the life expectancy of users is only two to 
three years.
177
 Because it is so addictive (more addictive than heroin), and because 
Russia generally lacks a drug treatment infrastructure, users are unable to quit.
178
 As 
a result, the number of users has skyrocketed.
179
 Between 2009 and 2011, the 
amount of krokodil seized in Russia increased twenty-three fold, and in the first 
three months of 2011 alone Russian authorities confiscated sixty-five million 
doses.
180
 
Fortunately, krokodil has not yet reached the United States.
181
 The DEA reported 
in October 2013 that NFLIS had not registered a desomorphine submission in the 
United States since 2004.
182
 However, the scourge of krokodil in Russia is just one 
example of the harmful international prevalence of synthetic drugs. And, as with 
other international challenges, controlling synthetic drug use will require 
international cooperation, especially due to the quickly changing nature of the 
product supply. 
Preliminary steps have been taken at the international level to confront synthetic 
drugs, and the U.S. has been a part of advocating for progress.
183
 Most importantly, 
the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), of which the U.S. is a 
member, enacted Resolution 55/1 in 2012, which requested that the UNODC create a 
global early warning system.
184
 The CND reaffirmed its request to the UNODC in 
2013 with Resolution 56/4.
185
 The UNODC has since created an early warning 
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system, but it is in its infancy.
186
 The creation of such a system—which is meant to 
monitor synthetic drug activity worldwide and alert countries of new synthetic 
substances—is an important step at the international level.
187
 
However, in order for the system to be effective, it must incorporate information 
from domestic systems across the world, particularly countries with high synthetic 
drug use. The Department of State—the agency with primary U.S. authority at the 
UNODC and CND—with assistance from the DEA, should make development of 
the system a foreign affairs priority and take the international lead on 
implementation.
188
 As a country with a significant amount of synthetic drug use, it is 
in the interest of the United States to use its influence to ensure the UNODC’s early 
warning system is robust.
189
 The U.S. should therefore invest the diplomatic time 
and energy, monetary resources, and political capital to develop the system.  
First, the U.S. should incorporate its equivalent of a domestic early warning 
system, NFLIS, into the UNODC’s system as soon as possible. This would show the 
rest of the world that the United States will lead by example regarding development 
of the system. The next priority would be to incorporate the European Union’s early 
warning system. The European Union’s system—the only regional early warning 
system in existence—comprises twenty-seven European Union countries, as well as 
Norway, and two European Union candidate countries, Croatia and Turkey.
190
 
Individual countries with significant synthetic drug problems, such Russia, Canada, 
and Australia, should also be prioritized for early inclusion into the UNODC’s 
system.
191
 
It is possible to imagine a reality where new synthetic drugs would only last a 
few weeks on the street in one country before the entire world was aware of 
information pertaining to their chemical structure, trafficking, and use. Governments 
around the world would then be able to schedule or otherwise control and prepare for 
these substances before they arrive. Such a system would be especially effective in 
the United States should it be combined with recommendation two above. Indeed, if 
the DEA alerted states to new synthetic drugs identified at both the international and 
domestic levels through NFLIS, as incorporated into the UNODC’s early warning 
system, instead of playing catch-up with synthetic drug manufacturers, states would 
then have the advantage. For such a reality to come to fruition, the U.S. must first 
take the lead on developing the nascent UNODC early warning system.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Synthetic drugs pose unique challenges to government control efforts due to a 
quickly changing product supply and the ability of manufacturers and retail sellers to 
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market them to the general public as “legal” alternatives to illicit drugs. Urgent 
action must be taken to prevent these substances from taking permanent root in the 
U.S. drug market. The consequences of inaction are likely to lead to a rise in 
negative public health effects,
192
 violent DTOs competing with law enforcement and 
each other for a lucrative new revenue stream,
193
 and more profits going to finance 
terror groups.
194
 
The federal statutory regime, particularly the DEA’s temporary scheduling 
authority and the Analogue Act, were not designed to, and are not capable of, 
providing federal law enforcement and prosecutors with effective tools to control 
these substances.
195
 A fast and flexible new “immediate scheduling” authority is 
needed. In addition, with Congress unwilling to prioritize synthetic drugs, states, 
who are more willing to act but do not have the resources or national perspective to 
keep up with the quickly changing product supply, need the DEA to use NFLIS to 
alert them of new synthetic substances emerging across the country.
196
 Finally, 
because synthetic drugs are a problem that is international in scope, the U.S. should 
make the development of a strong UNODC global early warning system a foreign 
policy priority.
197
 
The effort to control synthetic drugs in America is not a fight that can be “won” 
or “lost.”  These substances and their progeny will likely be with us for the indefinite 
future. However, by prioritizing the issue early and taking the steps discussed above, 
their potentially devastating consequences can be limited. Based on the speed and 
ease in which these substances are created and evolve in a globalized world, time is 
of the essence. 
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